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Software Copyrights as Loan Collateral:
Evaluating the Reform Proposals
by
PATRICK R. BARRY*
Introduction
Software has become a major force in the world economy.' Not
only are the revenues generated by the production and sale of
software significant,2 but software also plays critical roles in the devel-
opment of technology3 and in the organization of institutions from
small businesses to vast governmental bureaucracies.4 These roles will
likely expand as our society becomes increasingly reliant on informa-
tion as a commodity. As the role of software in society expands and
changes, the law must keep pace.5
This Note explains how recent court decisions expanding the ap-
plication of federal copyright law have rendered obsolete the current
* J.D. Candidate, 1995; B.A. Columbia College, 1989. The author would like to
thank his wife, Christine, for her loving support and also Meredith Jackson and Nelson D.
Crandall for their contributions to this Note.
1. ANTHONY LAWRENCE CLAPES, SoFrwARE, COPYRIGHT AND COMPETrITON: THE
LOOK AND FEEL OF THE LAW 19 (1989).
2. Total industry revenues in the United States have been estimated in the tens of
billions of dollars. STEERING COMM. FOR INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SoFrwAP 3 [hereinafter
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL].
3. See Darren J. Carroll, When More Is Less: Controlling the Market for Computer
Software Enhancements, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1321, 1322 (1992) (discussing the role
software plays in the control and development of technology).
4. For example, consider the United States Copyright Office. The Copyright Office
is preparing to revamp its system for the intake and processing of documents and in the
future will be highly dependent upon optical scanners and character-recognition software
to process the massive inflow of papers submitted for recordation. Telephone Interview
with Bill Fralic, Staff Attorney, U.S. Copyright Office (Jan. 21, 1994).
5. Industry leaders are concerned about the ability of Congress and the courts to
keep up with the pace of technical change and in recent years have taken steps to make
their concerns known to the legal community. See NA'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
2, at xi.
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regime for the perfection6 of security interests in copyrights. It then
examines some current reform proposals and identifies which aspects
of those proposals would help software companies 7 produce important
new products by facilitating the use of copyrights as loan collateral.
The software industry's continued commercial vitality depends in
large part upon the various bodies of law that affect the creation, pro-
tection, and use of software products. One important use of copy-
rights underlying software products is as collateral in loan
transactions. The two most important legal regimes bearing upon the
use of copyrights to secure debts are the Copyright Act of 19768 and
the Uniform Commercial Code. Taken together, these two statutes
govern both the substantive and the transactional issues arising in con-
junction with the use of copyrights as collateral, though each has its
particular focus and characteristics.
The Copyright Act plays a critical role in the development of new
software products by conferring substantive rights of exclusivity and
control over the copyrighted material.9 These rights are important to
software developers because while software products may require
years of development, they are highly susceptible to quick and inex-
pensive duplication. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution perceived
the value of encouraging innovation and the development of new
ideas and made express provision for the preservation of authors' and
inventors' exclusive rights in their works.' 0 Through the Copyright
Act, Congress has fostered software creativity by protecting the ef-
forts of developers from unauthorized copying and exploitation."
6. If a security interest is perfected, it is senior in priority to most subsequent inter-
ests of other creditors. See DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS (3d ed. 1993).
7. "Software companies" or "software developers" refer to the myriad of companies
that produce computer software or hold significant copyrights to computer software. Com-
puter software can take many forms, including, but not limited to, operating systems
"burned into" read-only memory (ROM) chips; databases, which may be embedded in
computer programs; and application programs. G. Larry Engel & Mark F. Radcliffe, Intel-
lectual Property Financing for High-Technology Companies, 19 UCC L.J. 3, 28 (1986).
8. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
9. The Copyright Act gives a copyright holder a number of exclusive rights including
the right to enjoy the revenues generated by the copyrighted work and the power to ex-
clude others from doing so. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Thus, the Copyright Act confers a
limited monopoly and rewards the author's intellectual effort. CLAPES, supra note 1, at 162.
10. "The Congress shall have the power... to Promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. "[S]oftware is now firmly embedded within the Copyright Act's protection of lit-
erary works." Carroll, supra note 3, at 1329. The Copyright Act defines a "computer pro-
gram" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer
in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). "Literary works" are
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Copyrights have emerged as the preferred form of intellectual prop-
erty protection for software companies in the United States12 and, as
such, are the most prominent form of intellectual property held by
such companies.13
Article 9 of the U.C.C., the touchstone of state commercial fi-
nance law, is also critical to the software industry's continued success.
The procedural and substantive dictates of Article 9 shape the way in
which lenders perceive and value one of a developer's most significant
assets-its intellectual property.14 This, in turn, has a ripple effect
upon incentives for creativity. The basic argument runs as follows: If
commercial finance law imposes inordinate costs and risks upon lend-
ers in conjunction with the use of intellectual property as collateral,
then lenders will be less likely to extend credit to companies with a
large proportion of their assets in this form.1 5 Therefore, finance laws
that are uncertain or unclear or that impose procedural burdens on
the use of intellectual property as collateral reduce the value of such
defined as "works... expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols
or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books ... tapes, disks, or
cards, in which they are embodied." Id.
12. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 22.
13. Patent protection and trade secret protection are also available for software. See
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 22-41; David Bender, Trade Secret Software
Protection: Recent Developments, in COMPUTER SoFTWARE 1988 PROTEMCON AND MAR-
KETING 467 (PLI Patent, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. 255, 1988) (trade secrets); Albert E. Fey & Roberta J. Morris, Patenting Com-
puter Software, in COMPUTER SoFrwARE 1988 PROTECrION AND MARKETING, supra at 515
(patents). Patents have only recently come into use in the context of software, after the
Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), which stated that the
use of an algorithm does not render unpatentable an invention that would otherwise be
eligible for protection.
Software developers have long relied on state trade secret laws to protect secret as-
pects of their programs. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 29-30. Trade secret
law is entirely a matter of state law; no federal statutes apply to such security interests.
Robert S. Bramson, Intellectual Property as Collateral-Patents, Trade Secrets, Trademarks
and Copyrights, 36 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1583 n.82 (1981). Material protected by state trade
secret law may mature into copyrightable matter when it becomes "fixed in a tangible
medium of expression." See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1988). Upon the material becoming
"fixed," any protection it had under state law is preempted by the Copyright Act. See 17
U.S.C. § 301 (1988). This fact takes on some significance given recent precedent holding
that security interests in unregistered copyrights are unperfected. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 91-94. However, a complete discussion of patents and trade secrets is beyond
the scope of this Note.
14. Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Secured Financing and Informa-
tion Property Rights, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 195, 199 (1987).
15. This premise is widely accepted. See id. at 199 n.9.; Harold R. Weinberg & Wil-
liam J. Woodward, Jr., Legislative Process and Commercial Law: Lessons from the Copy-
right Act of 1976 and the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Bus. LAW. 437 (1993). But see
James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REv.
473 (1984) (purporting to find a lack of theoretical support for this premise).
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property by preventing its use to secure loans.16 This, in turn, reduces
market incentives for the creation of new software and hinders en-
trepreneurial efforts by reducing the universe of potential collateral
available to such companies.
Loan transactions involving software companies are particularly
affected by the interlocking structures of copyright and commercial
finance law.17 The software industry has seen rapid growth in recent
years,' 8 spurred at least in part by the relatively low capital require-
ments for participation in the market. 19 Because software developers
can produce a product largely from individual effort with only mini-
mal capital input, 20 it is not unusual for a program written by an indi-
vidual or a small group to become a major force in the software
market.21 When this occurs, the young firm's principal assets are in-
tangible,22 including its intellectual property rights and any contract
rights it may have obtained.23 The firm's other property, such as its
equipment and fixtures, is usually of little value given the industry's
low capital requirements. 24 Therefore, intellectual property is often
the only valuable asset of many firms in the software industry.
When a start-up software company wishes to finance large-scale
production, marketing, and distribution of its product or when a more
established software vendor desires to make operational changes re-
quiring an infusion of capital, copyrights and related receivables25 may
be used as collateral for a bank loan. As discussed, copyrights loom
large in such financings, particularly because the firm's other (tangi-
16. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 14, at 200.
17. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 14, at 195-202 (discussing how software
companies and other holders of information assets are affected by the interrelationship
between copyright and commercial finance law).
18. "Market statistics vary, but they suggest that over the past 25 years the number of
U.S. software firms has quadrupled, and the size of the product market has been doubling
about every five years." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 3.
19. CLAPES, supra note 1, at 22.
20. Market entry costs have increased somewhat in recent years, given the demands
of an expanding market. Negotiating compatibility with other products, testing, and cus-
tomer support are all areas requiring capital outlay. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 2, at ix.
21. CLAPES, supra note 1, at 22.
22. Contract rights and intellectual property rights, including the right to receive pay-
ment under a copyright license agreement, are both "general intangibles" under the U.C.C.
See U.C.C. §§ 9-106, 9-106:1, 9-106:8, & 9-106:9 (1990). Here the word "intangible" is used
only to indicate the incorporeal nature of start-up software company assets and not as a
statement of U.C.C. Article 9 applicability.
23. See Engel & Radcliffe, supra note 7, at 3.
24. See supra note 19.
25. This Note uses the phrase "copyright-related receivables" or "related receivables"
to denote rights to be paid that accrue to the holder or licensee of a copyright through that
party's exploitation of the copyright, whether by license agreement or by some other
means.
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ble) assets tend to have little value.2 6 Because the nexus between fed-
eral copyright law and state finance law imposes greater lender risk,
cost, or uncertainty than in a standard tangible property financing, the
value of the property as security is diminished.27 Accordingly, the
software company has a smaller pool of assets available to entice re-
source providers than it would if the law did not discriminate among
types of collateral. Thus, the law governing use of copyrights as collat-
eral hinders the company's ability to leverage itself and to bring a use-
ful product to market.
At present, software developers face an uncertain nexus between
copyright law and finance law.28 This state of affairs has prompted
commentators, business people, and politicians alike to call for
changes in the law to encourage creativity and investment in software
development.29 Part I of this Note describes the legal foundation for
the current state of the law,30 explicates a case that has resolved some
of the uncertainty plaguing this area for years,31 and discusses some of
the legal and logistical fallout from this decision.3 2 Part II discusses a
number of recent reform proposals advocated by the American Bar
Association Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual Property,
the Permanent Editorial Board Article 9 Study Group, and recent leg-
islation introduced into Congress. Part Ill evaluates the effect these
proposals would have on software companies and suggests an appro-
priate resolution of the current debate.
I. Background
A. Uncertainty in the Field
In the past, the relationship between the Copyright Act and the
U.C.C. has been unclear. Ambiguity in the U.C.C. coupled with a
lack of guidance from the Copyright Act and the courts left practition-
ers uncertain whether state or federal law controlled perfection of se-
curity interests in copyrights. 3 When schemes conflict, the resulting
uncertainty leads to litigation and "raises the costs of contracting be-
cause lawyers attempt to comply with competing regimes rather than
26. Copyrights are valuable to software developers due to the limited monopoly they
confer upon the copyright holder. See supra note 9.
27. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 14, at 197-204.
28. 1993 A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON SECURrrY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REP. 1 [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
29. See NAT'L RESEARCH CoUNCIL, supra note 2, at x-xi; TASK FoRCE REPORT, supra
note 28; PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTiCLE 9 RP. 50-55 (1992) [hereinafter P.E.B. REPORT].
30. See infra Part I(A).
31. See infra Part I(B).
32. See infra Part I(C).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 36-51.
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risk a faulty transaction." 34 Security interests in copyrights present
one such conflict between the U.C.C. and the Copyright Act.35
Although the U.C.C. generally governs formation 36 and perfec-
tion37 of security interests in personal property, copyrights present an
exceptional case. The U.C.C. itself is ambiguous concerning whether
its perfection provisions cover security interests in copyrights.38 The
fact that the U.C.C. definition of "general intangibles" includes intel-
lectual property places copyrights within the purview of Article 9.39
Security interests in general intangibles can be perfected once the se-
curity interest has attached within the meaning of U.C.C. section 9-
203 by filing a financing statement pursuant to U.C.C. section 9-302.40
However, U.C.C. section 9-104(a) provides that Article 9 does not ap-
ply to security interests in any property to the extent that rights in
such property are governed by federal statutes.41 Furthermore, sec-
tion 9-302(3)(a) states that a U.C.C. filing "is not necessary or effec-
tive to perfect a security interest in property subject to (a) a statute...
of the United States which provides for a national or international
registration... or which specifies a place of filing different from that
specified in this Article." 42 The Official Code Comment to this section
34. Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 15, at 438.
35. See infra notes 36-51.
36. Generally, for a security interest in personal property to become effective against
third parties, le., to "attach," the lender and the debtor must agree to create the security
interest, there must be a signed security agreement or a transfer of possession, and value
must be given. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1991).
37. In most cases a lender can perfect a security interest by filing a financing state-
ment with the relevant state official, usually the Secretary of State, although the U.C.C.
provides for alternative means of perfection depending upon the personal property in
question. See U.C.C. § 9-302 (1991). The rules surrounding perfection of security interests
are important because they "assist in the determination of the priority of rights held by the
lender in the collateral against third parties." John L. Mesrobian & Kenneth R. Shaefer,
Secured Transactions Based on Intellectual Property, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y,
827, 831 (1990). Priority most often becomes relevant in determining the rights of creditors
in bankruptcy proceedings or when claims are made by third party purchasers of the collat-
eral. See generally Thomas M.S. Hemnes & Susan Barbieri Montgomery, The Bankruptcy
Code, the Copyright Act, and Transactions in Computer Software, 7 CoMPUTER/L.J. 327
(1987) (discussing the effect of a software producer's bankruptcy on software license and
asset purchase transactions). Perfection also serves the practical function of giving notice
to interested parties of the existence of a security interest in the property in question. See
Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine), 116
B.R. 194, 200 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
38. See, e.g., Bramson, supra note 13, at 1581 (noting that it is unclear whether the
Article 9 filing provisions apply to security interests in copyrights).
39. U.C.C. § 9-106:1 (1990).
40. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1990) (stating the general rule that all but the listed excep-
tions must be filed to perfect a security interest and failing to list general intangibles);
U.C.C. § 9-401 (1990) (stating the proper place for filing).
41. U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1990).
42. U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a) (1990).
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lists the Copyright Act as just such a statute and states that when "an
adequate system of filing, state or federal, has been set up outside this
Article... perfection of a relevant security interest can-be had only
through compliance with that system. ' 43 Although the Official Com-
mentary does not have the force of law, these comments strongly sug-
gest that the drafters intended to remove copyrights from Article 9
coverage. This interpretation seems correct because section 205(a) of
the Copyright Act has established a comprehensive method for re-
cording security interests in copyrights with a national registration sys-
tem and a central ling location (the Copyright Office) different from
that established by the U.C.C.44
On the other hand, the Official Commentary to section 9-104(a)
of the U.C.C. arguably contradicts the Official Commentary to section
9-302. The former states:
Although the Federal Copyright Act contains provisions permitting
the mortgage of a copyright and for the recording of an assignment
of a copyright... such a statute would not seem to contain sufficient
provisions regulating the rights of the parties and third parties to
exclude security interests in copyrights from the provisions of this
Article.45
This Commentary asserts that the Copyright Act as it then existed
would not satisfy the "step-back" requirement of section 9-104 and
consequently that the U.C.C. does not yield to that federal statute, at
least in regards to the perfection of security interests in copyrights.
But the plain meaning of the Official Commentary to section 9-302 is
that a U.C.C. filing is ineffective to perfect a security interest and that
the federal statute controls.46 The apparent incongruity between
these two commentaries renders the text of the U.C.C. ambiguous.47
43. U.C.C. § 9-302:1 (1990).
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1988).
45. U.C.C. § 9-104:1 (1990) (emphasis added).
46. When the Commentary was drafted, the Federal Copyright Act of 1909 was the
relevant statute, not the modem Copyright Act of 1976. The 1909 Act required only the
recordation of "assignments" and did not mention security interests. Federal Copyright
Act, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075-88 (1909) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 30
(1947)). Perhaps this led the drafters to state in the Commentary to U.C.C. § 9-104 that
the Federal Copyright Act would not remove perfection of security interests in copyrights
from Article 9's coverage. See Bramson, supra note 13, at 1580-81. Whatever the case, the
passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 with its well-defined recordation and notice system
created a strong argument that the provisions of U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a) should apply, remov-
ing the perfection of security interests in copyrights from the purview of Article 9. Id. But
despite the strong case for federal preemption, and absent a definitive answer on the ques-
tion from the courts, practitioners have continued to make both state and federal filings.
See eg., Ud at 1579 (advising practitioners to make dual filings).
47. One ambiguity is whether the U.C.C. explicitly removes perfection of security in-
terests in copyrights from its coverage, and not whether federal law preempts the U.C.C..
Of course, state law cannot control the issue of federal preemption. Rather, the question
The Copyright Act itself is relatively unhelpful regarding the
perfection of security interests in copyrights. The Act permits transfer
of copyright ownership by "an assignment, mortgage... or any other
conveyance, alienation or hypothecation. '48 It also allows recordation
of any "document pertaining to a copyright"49 to serve as constructive
notice to all third parties of the information contained in the docu-
ment.50 However, the Copyright Act does not explicitly refer to se-
curity interests,51 and the above-cited provisions constitute the full
extent of the statute's coverage of the issue. Given the complexity
and range of subject matter associated with the creation, perfection,
and foreclosure of security interests, the Act's coverage is far from
comprehensive. One might wonder how such a skeleton framework
could preempt the U.C.C.
B. Peregrine
Until the recent Central District of California decision in Pere-
grine Entertainment, Ltd. v. Capitol Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n
(In re Peregrine),52 commentators and practitioners were uncertain
whether the U.C.C. provided a parallel system for recordation of se-
curity interests to that contained in federal copyright law.5 3 As a re-
sult, lawyers traditionally made filings under both systems to ensure
of preemption depends upon whether federal regulation is so pervasive as to indicate that
"Congress 'left no room for supplementary state regulation,"' or if "'the federal interest is
so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject."' Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 713 (1985) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). A
second, perhaps more important ambiguity surrounds the extent to which the U.C.C. is
preempted by federal law. For example, even if perfection is governed by federal recorda-
tion, do the post-default remedies of Article 9 still apply? For a discussion of the uncertain
extent of federal preemption and of problems that may result from this uncertainty, see
infra text accompanying notes 87-93.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1988).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1988).
51. The Copyright Act relies on an older financing concept, called the "collateral as-
signment," to describe the security relationship. A "collateral assignment" is a transfer of
title to the secured party accompanied by a "license" back to the debtor of certain rights
under that copyright and a contractual understanding that title will be reconveyed to the
debtor upon repayment. See Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 15, at 443. The U.C.C.
uses the more modem "bundle of rights" concept of title, which describes a security inter-
est as one stick in the bundle of rights held by the debtor. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra
note 14, at 201-02.
52. 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
53. See Bramson supra note 13, at 1579; see also Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 14,
at 196 ("The questions of whether or to what extent federal laws preempt state rules for
perfecting a security interest or determining its priority have not been authoritatively
resolved.").
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
SOFTWARE COPYRIGHTS AS LOAN COLLATERAL
that the security interest had been effectively perfected.54 Peregrine
attempted to resolve some of the uncertainty surrounding such trans-
actions by holding that the U.C.C. is preempted by the Copyright Act
and that filing a U.C.C. financing statement with the Secretary of
State is ineffective to perfect a security interest either in a copyright or
in copyright-related receivables.55
Peregrine involved the bankruptcy of Peregrine Entertainment, a
company in the business of licensing films. Peregrine's principal assets
were its library of copyrights, distribution rights, and licenses to ap-
proximately 145 films, and its accounts receivable arising from the li-
censing of the films. These assets were pledged as collateral to secure
a six million dollar line of credit. The lender filed both the security
agreement and a form U.C.C.-1 financing statement describing the
collateral with relevant state agencies, but did not record its security
interest in the United States Copyright Office.56 Upon filing for bank-
ruptcy, Peregrine brought suit as a Chapter 11 debtor in possession
against the lender, claiming that the lender's security interest in the
film copyrights and in the accounts receivable was unperfected be-
cause the lender failed to register the security interest with the Copy-
right Office.57 As debtor in possession, Peregrine claimed a judicial
lien on all assets, including the copyrights and receivables, and the
power to avoid the allegedly unperfected security interest for the ben-
efit of the estate.58 The debtor's claims put the question whether the
U.C.C. provides a parallel and equally effective system for the perfec-
tion of security interests in copyrights squarely at issue.5 9
As a prelude to its preemption analysis, the Peregrine court first
considered whether the Copyright Act applied to the particular secur-
ity interests in question. The court held that the security interest, both
in the copyrights themselves and in the accounts receivable generated
by those copyrights, was subject to recordation with the Copyright Of-
fice pursuant to section 205(a) of the Copyright Act.60
The first aspect of this ruling, concerning the copyrights them-
selves, generally comports with the interpretations of commentators
and with the language of the statute.61 The second part of this ruling,
which holds that security interests in accounts receivable can only be
54. See Ninmer & Krauthaus, supra note 14, at 196.
55. 116 B.R. at 203-04.
56. id at 197-98.
57. Id. at 198.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 197.
60. Id. at 199.
61. See Mesrobian & Shaefer, supra note 37, at 841-42.
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perfected by recordation with the Copyright Office, is more question-
able and has been criticized by commentators.62
As support for this second part, the court cited the Copyright Of-
fice's definition of a "document pertaining to a copyright" as one with
"a direct or indirect relationship to the existence, scope, duration, or
identification of a copyright, or to the ownership, division, allocation,
licensing, transfer, or exercise of rights under a copyright. That rela-
tionship may be past, present, future, or potential. ' 63 This definition
is quite broad and apparently encompasses a wide variety of docu-
ments that only marginally relate to a copyright. Despite the breadth
of this language, however, it is not immediately obvious that an agree-
ment memorializing a lender's security interest in a borrower's right
to be paid royalties should qualify as such a document. Relying on 17
U.S.C. § 106, which entitles the holder of a copyright to receive all
income derived from the display of creative work, the court held that
"an agreement creating a security interest in the receivables generated
by a copyright may also be recorded in the Copyright Office." 64 The
court evidently reasoned that because receipt of royalty payments
under a license agreement is a "right" of the copyright holder, a secur-
ity interest in such a receivable must have at least an "indirect rela-
tionship" to the exercise of that right and is therefore recordable as a
"document pertaining to a copyright." However, neither the Copy-
right Act nor the Compendium of Copyright Office Practices65 explic-
itly mentions accounts receivable, and the court was forced to
extrapolate from the existing rules to reach this result.
After determining the applicability of the Copyright Act, the Per-
egrine court next addressed the issue of federal preemption of Article
9.66 The court first observed that the Copyright Act "establishes a
uniform method for recording security interests in copyrights. 67 It
then reasoned that Congress intended the Copyright Act to preempt
Article 9 with regard to security interests in copyrights because the
existence of concurrent and equally effective systems would hinder
the usefulness of both.68 The court argued that two parallel systems
62. E.g., Eloise L. Morgan, Perfecting Security Interests in Copyright-Related Receiv-
ables, 204 N.Y. L.J. 55 (Sept. 18, 1990); Joseph H. Levie, Perfecting Security Interests in
Copyrights, 204 N.Y. L.J. 53 (Sept. 6, 1990).
63. Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 201.4(a)(2) (1992)).
64. Id.
65. Compendium of Copyright Office Practices II, 1602-1603 (identifying which
documents the Copyright Office will accept for filing) [hereinafter Compendium]. The
Compendium is a manual that the Copyright Office staff uses as a general guide to its
examination of claims to copyright, recordation of documents, and related practices. Policy
Decision, 57 Fed. Reg. 27,074 (June 17, 1992) [hereinafter Policy Decision].
66. Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199.
67. Id. at 200.
68. Id.
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would reduce the level of certainty that a search had revealed all con-
flicting interests.69  The court also pointed out that the U.C.C.
method for determining priority conflicts with the Copyright Act, not-
ing that this type of direct interference with the operation of federal
law weighs heavily in favor of preemption.70 Therefore, the court con-
cluded, the Copyright Act preempted Article 9 with regard to the
perfection of security interests in copyrights and copyright-related
receivables. 71
The court also analyzed the U.C.C. itself, concluding that, by its
own terms, Article 9 does not apply to the security interest at issue.72
Essentially, the court evaluated the applicability of sections 9-104 and
9-302 and related Official Commentaries much as discussed above73
and ruled that the U.C.C. "step-back" provision embodied in section
9-104 takes security interests in copyrights and related receivables
outside of Article 9's coverage.74
Finally, the court held that because the lender had not perfected
its security interest, Peregrine could recover the lender's interest for
the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.75 Under the "strong arm clause"
of 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), which gives the debtor in possession every
right and power conferred by state law on a judicial lienholder,76 Pere-
grine was able to "trump" the lender's unperfected security interest in
the copyrights and the receivables.77 In effect, the court held that the
lender made a six-million-dollar unsecured loan.
In handing down its ruling, the court seemed to be aware of the
commercial implications of requiring security interests in copyrights
69. Id.
70. Id. at 201. See supra note 47 for a discussion of preemption criteria. While the
U.C.C. generally confers priority on the party to file first, U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1990), the
Copyright Act has a "look-back" provision that complicates the determination of priority
status as among conflicting transfers. Under § 205(d) of the Copyright Act, when two con-
flicting transfers exist, the transfer executed first has priority if it is recorded pursuant to
the § 205(c) constructive notice requirements and within one month (two months, if exe-
cuted outside of the United States). 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1988).
71. Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 201-02.
72. Id. at 202-04. This ruling was largely anticipated by commentators. See, eg.,
Note, Perfection of Security Interests in Intellectual Property: Federal Statutes Preempt Arti-
cle 9,57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 135, 136-40, 156-58 (1988) (arguing that the Copyright Act of
1976 preempts Article 9).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
74. Peregrine, 116 B.R at 202-03.
75. Id. at 204-08.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1993). More precisely, § 544 confers state law rights upon
the trustee in bankruptcy, and § 1107(a) extends those rights to the debtor in possession.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1993).
77. Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 207. At least one critic has assailed the court's interpreta-
tion of § 544(a). See Steven 0. Weise, Survey: Uniform Commercial Code, 47 Bus. LAW.
1593 (1992).
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and related receivables to be filed with the Copyright Office rather
than with the Secretary of State. The court noted that "filing with the
Copyright Office can be much less convenient than filing under the
U.C.C." and listed some of the procedural differences between the
two systems that make the federal filing more burdensome.78 Ulti-
mately the court concluded that, though more cumbersome, the fed-
eral system is not "unworkable" and that congressional action is
necessary to implement "more adequate procedures. ' 79
C. Criticism of Peregrine
Many commentators have attacked the court's holding, but have
been largely unpersuasive in their attempts to challenge the court's
legal reasoning,8 0 however unappealing the result may be as a matter
of policy. The thrust of these attacks seems to be that, aside from
permissive recordation of receivables-related documents, the Copy-
right Act does not speak at all about receivables financing as a sub-
stantive matter and the court gives the federal statute too broad an
application. Thus, the court's holding stretches copyright law beyond
its traditional scope-an act Professor Jerome H. Reichman has said
will lead to "unsupportable restraints of trade and a breakdown of the
world's intellectual property system."'81
Perhaps echoing Professor Reichman's thesis, one critic argued
that the court's reasoning "has only a superficial logic" because "if the
proper place for recording a security interest turns on the genesis of
the receivable, the U.C.C.'s comprehensive structure for perfecting se-
curity interests is weakened."82 But this assertion, although probably
78. Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 203. The court further noted that
filing with the Copyright Office can be much less convenient than filing under the
U.C.C. This is because U.C.C. filings are indexed by owner, while registration in
the Copyright Office is by title or copyright registration number. This means that
the recording of a security interest in a film library such as that owned by [Pere-
grine] will involve dozens, sometimes hundreds, of individual filings. Moreover,
as the contents of the film library changes [sic], the lienholder will be required to
make a separate filing for each work added to or deleted from the library. By
contrast, a U.C.C.-1 filing can provide a continuing, floating lien on assets.
Id. at 203 n.10 (citations omitted).
79. Id.
80. For example, one critic claimed that "a right to receive payment in respect of a
copyright" is not a "document" at all and thus should not be recordable under § 205.
Levie, supra note 62, at 6. This argument is weak because presumably the license agree-
ment creating the right to be paid and the security agreement attaching that right are "doc-
uments" in a conventional sense.
81. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 12.
82. Morgan, supra note 62, at 6. See supra note 37 for a discussion of perfection
under the U.C.C. In its comprehensive system, the U.C.C. distinguishes between "ac-
counts," which are rights to be paid "for goods sold or leased or for services rendered," and
all other rights to be paid. U.C.C. § 9-106 (1990). Rights to receive payment under
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true, does not show the court's legal analysis to be faulty. Rather it
points out why, from a policy perspective, the current state of the law
is unsatisfactory-because the policy goals of efficiency and simplicity
that guide the U.C.C. are undermined and no meaningful federal in-
terests are furthered by federal preemption in the area of
receivables83
The court's ruling is not incorrect merely because it favored a
more cumbersome and unwieldy system for perfecting security inter-
ests. Rather, the Peregrine court may have been "forced" into its
holding because of congressional inaction or oversight in drafting the
Copyright Act.8 As it explained, "this is the system Congress has es-
tablished and the court is not in a position to order more adequate
procedures. If the mechanics of filing turn out to pose a serious bur-
den, it can be taken up by Congress." 5 Part Im of this Note addresses
the question of what form congressional action should take.
licenses of copyrights are not accounts, but instead are "general intangibles," U.C.C. § 9-
106:1 (1990), that filing under § 9-302 is sufficient to perfect. See U.C.C. § 9-302 (1990).
For a discussion of how Peregrine weakens the U.C.C.'s comprehensive structure, see infra
notes 101-107 and accompanying text.
83. Three principal policies emerge from the language of the copyright clause: (1)
"the promotion of learning"; (2) "the preservation of the public domain"; and (3) "the
protection of the author." L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE
OF CoPY GH . A LAw OF UsERS' RiGHTs 48-49 (1991). The promotion of learning is the
"keystone" policy. See id at 49-50. The basic concept is that the publishing of a new work
contributes to learning by adding to the general body of knowledge available for study. Id.
Protection of the public domain-the realm of things and ideas not subject to private own-
ership-is furthered through a quid pro quo with the author who obtains a limited-in-time
exclusive right in exchange for the creation and publication of new ideas. Id. at 50-51. The
policy of protecting authors is vindicated by giving authors an exclusive right to publish
their words for a limited amount of time. Id. at 51-52. Nowhere do security interests in
accounts receivable figure into this scheme of interlocking policies. Furthermore, even if
receivables were implicated by federal copyright policy, given the logistical obstacles cre-
ated by the federal filing regime, see supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text, the cur-
rent system works against those policies.
84. TWo commentators observed that
[i]n light of the court's concern with congressional intent behind the [Copyright
Act], the complexity of the interaction issues, and the statutory silence on the
preemption issue, the court in Peregrine may have been forced to the decision
that federal law broadly preempted state commercial law, whatever may have
been the intent of Congress on the issue.... Indeed, the most disturbing and
controversial aspect of the decision-that federal preemption extended to the se-
curity interest in receivables resulting from the copyrights-may have been inevi-
table as well.
Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 15, at 170 (footnotes omitted).
85. Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Pere-
grine), 116 B.R. 194, 203 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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D. Peregrine's Impact
The decision in Peregrine appears to have been accepted largely
as an accurate statement of the law. 86 Although Peregrine has the pos-
itive effect of reducing uncertainty in this area by resolving the pre-
emption question, it creates legal uncertainty regarding the scope of
federal preemption. Moreover, it highlights the impracticalities of
complying with federal law. Finally, Peregrine has sparked legislative,
agency, and private initiatives to correct perceived problems in the
current regime for perfecting security interests in copyrights.
(1) Peregrine and Federal Preemption
One difficulty resulting from Peregrine concerns the undefined
scope of federal preemption or, conversely, the uncertain extent to
which the U.C.C. abdicates control over copyrights and related receiv-
ables by its own terms. Federal copyright law speaks neither to the
formation of security interests nor to foreclosure issues, both of which
have traditionally been left to state law. The principal uncertainty is
the extent to which the Copyright Act impinges on these heretofore
strictly state law strongholds and the extent to which the U.C.C. fills
the gaps.87 For example, what role does federal law play with regard
to rights in a copyright acquired by a transferee upon foreclosure?88
As discussed below, a copyright must be registered for the federal fil-
ing to effectively perfect a security interest.89 If this is so, does state
law control perfection of security interests in unregistered copyrights?
These and other issues remain unresolved after Peregrine.90
(2) Additional Filing Burdens
As a practical matter, the holding in Peregrine means that bor-
rowers will potentially have to make a larger number of additional
filings than if the U.C.C. provided a parallel perfection system. One
reason for this is that the Copyright Act imposes a registration re-
86. See, e.g., AEG Acquisition Corp. v. Zenith Productions, Inc. (In re AEG Acquisi-
tion Corp.), 127 B.R. 34, 40 (1991) (citing Peregrine for the rule on perfection of security
interests in copyrights). However, it must be emphasized that Peregrine represents the
view in one district in California and does not have binding authority outside the district.
Notwithstanding the decision's limited jurisdictional reach, its effect on various groups
outside the district suggests that its importance may transcend jurisdictional lines.
87. The Official Commentary to U.C.C. § 9-104 specifies that "if the federal statute
contained no relevant provision, this Article could be looked to for an answer." U.C.C.
§ 9-104:1 (1990).
88. P.E.B. REPORT, supra note 29, at 53 (questioning the scope of federal law in the
foreclosure context).
89. See infra notes 92-93.
90. Another area of potential conflict concerns the differing title concepts employed
by each system. See supra note 51.
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quirement in addition to the recordation requirement of section 205.
For a recordation under section 205 to serve as constructive notice to
third parties, the copyrighted work must also have been registered
with the Copyright Office pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 409, and
410.91 Therefore, a transferee without notice, such as a bona fide pur-
chaser, will take if the recorded interest or transfer relates to an un-
registered copyright.92 This fact becomes significant in a bankruptcy
proceeding when, as the Peregrine court found, a debtor in possession
acting pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) is deemed to have taken in good
faith and without notice. 93 Therefore, lenders will likely require bor-
rowers to register their copyrights to protect against avoidance of se-
curity interests in bankruptcy proceedings. 94
Because works must be registered on an individual basis and rec-
ordation must specifically reference the registered work in order to
serve as constructive notice, perfection of a security interest in a copy-
right and related receivables involves a great deal of paperwork.95
Unlike Article 9, which contemplates filing on a "debtor's name ba-
sis,'96 no "blanket" filing is available under the federal system. This
means that after-acquired property of the debtor may not be encum-
bered by a lender without an additional filing. For software vendors,
many of whom periodically upgrade their products by producing new
versions, these federal registration and specificity requirements man-
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(2) (1988). Registration is also a prerequisite to judicial
enforcement of a copyright, except for actions for infringement of copyrights in foreign
works covered by the Berne Convention. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988).
92. In fact, this precise issue was decided in AEG Acquisition Corp. v. Zenith Produc-
tions, Ltd. (In re AEG Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34 (1991). There, the debtor was a
film library holding copyrights to motion pictures. Id. at 37. The debtor's predecessor gave
a creditor rights to three films as security for a loan. Id. at 37-38. The creditor filed in state
U.C.C. offices and in the Copyright Office, but did not register all of the films. Id. The
court held that the creditor's security interest in the two unregistered films was un-
perfected. Id. at 41-42.
93. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 204-08.
94. To register a work, an applicant must send at least one complete copy of the work
(two if published) along with a filing fee to the Register of Copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. § 408
(1988). The Register of Copyrights then determines whether the material submitted con-
stitutes copyrightable subject matter and, if the material is acceptable, issues the applicant
a certificate of registration. 17 U.S.C. § 410 (1988). Registration applications can be costly
and time-consuming. See Amended Copyright Reform Bill Is Approved by House Subcom-
mittee, 47 PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPYRIGHT J. 33 (1993) (describing proposed legislation in
the House of Representatives to eliminate copyright registration as a requirement for in-
fringement suits). Additionally, the current backlog in the Copyright Office requires appli-
cants to wait for months before a determination of the suitability of the submission.
Telephone Interview with Bill Fralic, Staff Attorney, U.S. Copyright Office (Jan. 1, 1994).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(1) provides that a filed document will not provide constructive
notice unless it "specifically identifies the work to which it pertains."
96. See U.C.C. § 9-402 (1990).
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date a large number of repetitive, expensive, and burdensome
filings.97
Software companies are also adversely impacted because these
requirements make it unlikely that copyright-related accounts receiva-
ble will be as attractive as traditional collateral to a receivables finan-
cier.98 This is because receivables arising after the initial filing are not
covered without a new filing. Moreover, some companies face the ad-
ditional expense of paying for the lender's search and filing cost.99
(3) Uncertain Scope of the Impact
A further logistical difficulty stems from the Peregrine court's im-
plicit holding that a lender must fie with the Copyright Office if the
borrower's receivables are derived from goods, such as computers or
other devices, that contain copyrighted software. 1 0' Software has be-
come all-pervasive and now may be found as a material element of
overall value in any number of devices from jet engines to video
games.10' Absent a clear declaration by the court to the contrary,
careful lenders will make the federal filing for personal property "con-
taining" valuable software because a failure to do so may leave the
lender's security interest in that significant asset unpeffected. 1°2 If so,
the lender, or more likely the borrower, faces all the practical
problems associated with identifying and separating the various copy-
righted works and their respective owners for filing purposes. Thus,
software's pervasiveness coupled with the uncertainty surrounding the
law in this area will force the prudent lender to carefully scrutinize
property taken as security and to make precautionary filings. Legal
uncertainty translates into delay and increased loan costs that will
97. Peregrine and AEG also make it harder to use works in progress as collateral
because each time a change is made to a work, that work must be registered in order to
qualify as collateral subject to perfection. Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 15, at 474-
75.
98. Id. at 474 n.236.
99. Id.
100. See Morgan, supra note 62, at 6 ("[P]erfection of security interests in accounts
receivable must now be undertaken with an eye to the source from which the accounts
spring.").
101. Carroll, supra note 3, at 1322.
102. The melding of software with noncopyrightable elements also raises a number of
important legal questions. For example, must lenders to computer companies make a fed-
eral filing to cover the accounts receivable generated by the sale of computers loaded with
basic operating system software? If such a filing is required but not made, how is a court to
ascribe values to those parts of the goods for which the lender perfected its security inter-
est and to those for which it has not? The court has left lenders and borrowers the some-
what sticky problem of separating out, for filing purposes, the goods from the copyrighted
material such goods contain.
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likely deter lenders from accepting copyrights and related receivables
as collateral.
(4) Impact of Peregrine on Commercial Settings
To put the Peregrine ruling in a business context, consider the ex-
ample of the retail sale of a software program. Most purchasers of a
software program acquire only the diskette and a limited right to use
the program it contains.10 3 Therefore, the purchaser acquires a "li-
cense," not the copyright itself.1°4 Peregrine would subject retailers of
software products and items containing software or lenders taking se-
curity interests in the retailer's receivables to the filing requirements
of the Copyright Act. This weakens the U.C.C.'s perfection regime
and burdens commerce because retailers have a legitimate expecta-
tion that otherwise ordinary finance transactions will be governed by
state law. After Peregrine, however, lenders must look to the underly-
ing source of the receivable, which may be a mixture of software and
noncopyrightable elements, 0 5 to determine their compliance obliga-
tions. A lender may no longer avoid making the federal filing by tak-
ing a security interest only in the accounts receivable and not in the
copyrights themselves. Because the Copyright Act does not permit
"blanket" filing,106 but rather requires registration and recordation of
individual works, a lender must undertake a significant tracking and
maintenance effort to comply with the federal requirements.
The federal priority system also creates uncertainty by preventing
lenders from determining the existence of conflicting security inter-
ests. The Copyright Act priority scheme contains a "look-back" pro-
vision that requires a lender to wait up to three months after filing
before it can be certain that no conflicting security agreement cover-
ing the property will take priority 0 7 Again, the U.C.C. system, which
provides that the first to file receives priority, does not create such
uncertainty.
(5) Peregrine's Impact on the Copyright Office
As a direct result of the holding in Peregrine, the Copyright Of-
fice has been forced to alter its procedures, thereby significantly in-
creasing an applicant's uncertainty. The Copyright Office has
experienced a substantial increase in the number of documents sub-
103. See Carroll, supra note 3, at 1332 n.48.
104. it
105. For example, Peregrine would seem to compel a lender taking a security interest in
a computer retailer's receivables to make a federal filing if that retailer sells "bundled"
hardware and software packages.
106. See supra notes 95-96.
107. See supra note 70.
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mitted for recordation in the last few years, particularly after Pere-
grine was handed down,108 leading to a backlog of up to nine
months. 10 9 Although in the past the Copyright Office screened sub-
mitted documents for obvious errors or discrepancies and brought
these to the attention of the remitter, Peregrine has led to such an
influx of filings that the Copyright Office can no longer perform this
courtesy. 110 As a result, applicants have lost an additional safeguard
against error and its potential legal and economic consequences.
Chapter 16 of the Compendium, which sets forth the Copyright Of-
fice's practices and procedures for recording transfers and other docu-
ments pertaining to copyrights (including security interests), is
currently under review by the Office, primarily as a result of the Pere-
grine holding and related legislative activity."1 Certain copyright reg-
ulations' 12 are also being reviewed to determine whether they hinder
recordation. Pending legislative and private reform proposals have
thrown the Copyright Office into confusion and have rendered the
once clear procedural framework "a jumble. '"" 3
II. Reform Proposals
A number of groups are currently studying the legal and practical
issues raised by Peregrine,"14 and at least three reform proposals have
been published to date." 5 Each attempt to remedy the present prob-
lematic state of the law meets with its own benefits and drawbacks.
A. The Article 9 Study Group Approach
In early 1990 the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code ("P.E.B."), with the support of the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, established the Article 9 Study Committee ("Study
Group") to recommend changes to Article 9 of the U.C.C.116 As part
108. Policy Decision, supra note 65, at 27074.
109. Telephone Interview with Bill Fralic, Staff Attorney, U.S. Copyright Office (Jan. 1,
1994).
110. Policy Decision, supra note 65, at 27074 ("Because of the increased number and
complexity of documents submitted for recordation, the Office can no longer screen the
documents for content and engage in correspondence with the remitter over apparent
problems with the sufficiency of the document.").
111. Telephone Interview with Bill Fralic, Staff Attorney, U.S. Copyright Office (Jan. 1,
1994).
112. 37 C.F.R. §§ 201.4, 201.10, 201.25, & 201.26 (1992).
113. Telephone Interview with Bill Fralic, Staff Attorney, U.S. Copyright Office (Jan. 1,
1994).
114. See supra Part I.
115. See P.E.B. REPORT, supra note 29; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28; H.R. 897,
103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1993) (version 4 Dec. 1, 1993).
116. P.E.B. REPORT, supra note 29, at 1.
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of its review of Article 9, the Study Group developed an approach to
security interests in federally regulated intellectual property rights. 117
This proposed approach was designed to remedy the uncertainty in-
herent in the current regime concerning the extent of federal preemp-
tion"18 and to bring the recording system in line with "common
patterns of secured financing."' 19
The Study Group recommended a tripartite system of recorda-
tion.120 This system would employ both the current state and federal
schemes and would establish a federal "notice filing" overlay.121
Under the Study Group's approach, a security interest in federally
regulated intellectual property, such as a copyright, could be perfected
under either Article 9 or by filing in the federal index. 122 A third rec-
ordation system, the "notice" system, would be established at the fed-
eral level to notify parties attempting to file in the index of prior
Article 9 filings. 123
The Study Group also advocated revising federal and state law to
provide that priority in general be determined on the basis of time of
recordation1 24 However, the proposed system is not strictly "first-to-
file," like the U.C.C.12 For an Article 9 filing to be effective against
117. Id. at 50-51. Although the Study Group's primary focus concerned perfection and
priority, it also advocated making Part 5 of Article 9, concerning enforcement of security
interests, applicable as a matter of federal law. Id. at 53.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
119. P.E.B. REPORT, supra note 29, at 53.
120. Id. at 50-51. The Study Group recognized that it would be working within certain
political limits and thus recommended a scheme that was not necessarily ideal, but that
could be approved by Congress:
From the perspective of those who finance intellectual property, the ideal clarifi-
cation would result in a single set of substantive rules and a single filing system
governing security and other interests in all types of intellectual property. The
[Study Group] recognizes that this ideal is unlikely to be recognized. Congress
cannot be expected either to cede the field totally to state law or to integrate and
overhaul the federal systems.
Id. at 52.
121. Id. at 50-55.
122. For a copyright, the relevant federal index would be located at the Copyright Of-
fice. See supra text accompanying note 44.
123. The "notice" system would look a lot like an Article 9 filing. See supra note 37.
Filed documents would be indexed on a "debtor's name" basis, and the filing of a single
document would affect rights in all of the debtor's property of the kind described, including
after-acquired property and the proceeds thereof. P.E.B. REPORT, supra note 29, at 55.
The "notice" system also would "make effective a document that is filed before the secur-
ity interest attaches." Id.
124. Id. at 51. The Study Group's proposal would eliminate or at least "substantially"
reduce the Copyright Act's "look-back" period, during which a later transferee may take
priority in certain situations. Id. at 54 n.7.
125. See supra note 70.
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subsequent purchasers126 who record in the federal system, the state-
perfected party must also have filed in the federal "notice" system. 27
Thus, perfection may be achieved by making a first-in-time filing
either in the federal index alone or under Article 9 if accompanied by
a federal "notice" filing that precedes any conflicting federal filing. 12s
The Study Group's approach has significant benefits. First, the
system acknowledges the contributions made by the U.C.C. to mod-
em financing and updates the current regime to benefit from those
contributions. 129 Second, the Study Group's approach accounts for
the interests of parties who currently rely on their federal index filings
and of certain third parties who may find the federal system more
suitable for their purposes. 30 Third, the Study Group system clarifies
existing law and establishes a clear, albeit complex, regime for the
perfection of security interests in copyrights. Finally, the Study
Group's approach would not require Congress to abdicate its current
role completely' 3' and is therefore unlikely to generate substantial
legislative resistance.
There are, however, a number of drawbacks to the Study Group's
system. First, it requires multiple filings under either the federal or
state system. To file under the federal regime, the applicant must reg-
ister the copyright 32 and thus encounter many of the problems high-
lighted by the Peregrine decision.' 33 Filing under Article 9 allows the
applicant to benefit from the U.C.C.'s accommodation of modem fi-
nancing methods, 34 but requires an additional federal "notice" filing
to protect against a subsequent purchaser who files in the federal in-
dex.' 35 Second, because the federal system index works by registra-
tion number, 36 a party wishing to file under Article 9 will have to
make numerous searches for any transaction involving multiple copy-
rights. Third, the Study Group's system is complicated and may en-
126. "Purchaser" in this context includes a party taking a security interest. P.E.B. RE-
PORT, supra note 29, at 51.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 55.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 37, and 70.
130. "The [Study Group] recognizes that, although Article 9 filing systems work well
for secured parties, the existing federal recording systems may be more suitable than state
Article 9 filing systems for persons who take interests in intellectual property other than
security interests." P.E.B. REPORT, supra note 29, at 54. The Study Group seems to be
concerned with the interests of a buyer for value who uses the federal index to examine
title to specific indexed property.
131. P.E.B. REPORT, supra note 29, at 50-55.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
133. See supra Part I(B).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 37, and 70.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 121-128.
136. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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gender confusion by providing the applicant with too many options. 137
Finally, by preserving the federal index as a parallel recordation
scheme, the Study Group perpetuates a dual system ihat does not re-
flect modem patterns of secured financing, is unnecessarily conserva-
tive, and is inconsistent with the Group's stated goals.138
B. The ABA Task Force Approach
A second proposal comes from the American Bar Association
Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual Property. 39 As part of
its goal to suggest a comprehensive legal system governing security
interests in intellectual property, the Task Force recommends a
"mixed approach" for dealing with the issue of federal preemption
and the related legal and practical problems resulting from the current
state of the law.' 40 The Task Force approach would significantly alter
the regime for perfecting security interests in copyrights.
The Task Force set out to develop a system that would accom-
plish three basic objectives: (1) enable a third-party to determine who
has an interest in the property; (2) permit a perfected security interest
to survive when rights are transferred from state law to federal law
and vice versa; and (3) enable a secured party to encumber after-ac-
quired property and proceeds from a license or sale based on the ini-
tial filing.' 4' The "mixed approach" largely meets these goals.
The Task Force has a similar approach to that of the Study
Group, but rejects the federal index as a viable parallel recordation
system.142 Security interests in federally perfected intellectual prop-
erty, including copyrights, would be perfected by an Article 9 filing
supplemented by a "notice" filing at the federal level on a debtor's
name basis.' 43 The state filing would confer priority against lien credi-
tors, secured creditors, and all third parties other than subsequent
purchasers/assignees for value against whom the federal filing would
137. Cf. notes 68-69 and accompanying text (describing the Peregrine court's reasoning
that multiple filing systems lead to uncertainty and undermine the effectiveness of each).
138. The Study Group's reasons for adopting this less than ideal scheme may actually
be grounded in politics. See supra note 120.
139. The Business Law Section of the ABA established the task force in 1990 as a
result of concern expressed by various groups about the "unsatisfactory" state of the law
governing security interests in intellectual property. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28,
at 1.
140. The Task Force developed its recommendation with the goal of creating a system
likely to be enacted by Congress, which deals responsibly with the interests of various
parties, and which would provide certainty, ease of perfection, modest cost, and modest
change. TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 28, at 3.
141. Id
142. Id. at 14.
143. ld. at 9.
January 1995]
be required to establish priority.144 The federal filing would be a copy
of the form U.C.C.-1 filed at the state office with an appropriate cover
sheet.145
The primary advantage of the Task Force's report is its streamlin-
ing of the recordation process. While avoiding the federal system and
all of its problems,146 the "mixed approach" would preserve most of
the advantages of the state-law system, including debtor's name-based
filing, coverage for after-acquired property, and first-in-time
priority. 47
The Task Force approach also has certain disadvantages. It
would require dual filings-one at the state and one at the federal
level. This drawback is largely mitigated by the simple U.C.C.-like
form of the federal filing.' 48 However, the sweeping changes pro-
posed also present a jurisdictional problem because Congress may be
unwilling to defer so extensively to state law in this area. 149 The
"mixed approach" also fails to clarify the role that federal registration
will play in the "notice" filing requirement. 50
C. The Copyright Reform Act of 1993
In February 1993 Congressman Hughes introduced H.R. 897, the
Copyright Reform Act of 1993.151 The bill proposed a number of ma-
jor changes to the Copyright Act. Among the changes was a proposal
to overturn the ruling in Peregrine by restricting the extent of federal
preemption. 52 Other reforms in the bill included eliminating the re-
quirement that copyrights be registered for section 411(a) infringe-
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See supra Part I(D).
147. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 9.
148. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 9.
149. P.E.B. REPORT, supra note 29, at 50-55.
150. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 9.
151. H.R. 897, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). An identical bill was introduced in the
Senate by Senator DeConcini. S. 373, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
152. H.R. 897. Section 301 of the Copyright Act, entitled "Preemption with Respect to
other Laws," lists a number of areas not preempted by the Act. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1988).
Title 1 of the H.R. 897 would have added the phrase "perfecting security interests" to 17
U.S.C. § 301(b), thus exempting perfection of security interests from the Act's coverage.
H.R. 897. Presumably this would have overturned the holding in Peregrine. See supra text
accompanying notes 55-71.
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ment suits153 and making the Register of Copyrights a presidential
appointee. 154
Unfortunately, the bill's proposal to overturn Peregrine was an
inadequate response to the issues facing the software industry and
other interested parties. By abrogating Peregrine without clearly de-
fining the scope and applicability of state and federal law, the bill
would have reinstated the uncertainty that plagued perfection of se-
curity interests in copyrights prior to Peregrine.55 In fact, the bill
would have effectively increased the uncertainty by removing the only
significant authority on the reach of the Copyright Act. Perhaps for
these reasons, the Task Force submitted a statement to the House
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration
urging a more complete and effective overhaul of the Copyright
Act.156
After a number of amendments, 57 the bill passed the House' 58
without the provision statutorily overturning Peregrine.5 9 Although a
number of other key changes to the Copyright Act survived amend-
ment, 60 a chance for Congress to address the legal and logistical
problems highlighted by Peregrine'6' was lost.
IV. Going Beyond the Task Force Approach
All who have considered this issue will likely concede that the law
governing perfection of security interests in copyrights should change,
but the form that change should take remains an open question. Of
the existing proposals, the Task Force's approach is the most effective
in encouraging the use of copyrights as collateral. This approach best
reconciles the Copyright Act's internal conflict between its policy of
153. See supra note 92 (discussing the registration requirement). The proposal to re-
peal § 411(a) received support from software publishers at a hearing on the Senate bill held
by the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks. See Legislation:
Consensus Absent on Bill to End Mandatory Copyright Registration, 46 PAT. TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT J. 536 (1993).
154. H.R. 897.
155. See supra Part I(A).
156. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 14 n.22.
157. The amendments focused largely on simplifying the current registration proce-
dures. Changes to the Bill included provisions for public hearings on how to make the
registration process easier, the development of a short-form registration application, and
preserving the validity of an application containing errors made in good faith or in reliance
on counsel. See H.R. 897.
158. 139 CONG. REC H10,308 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993).
159. See H.R. 897. The other provisions discussed supra in the text accompanying
notes 154-155 remained intact. Id.
160. Notably, the bill proposes repeal of the registration prerequisite to infringement
actions. See H.R. 897.
161. See supra Part I(C).
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encouraging innovation 62 and its outdated transactional provisions, 163
while favorably resolving the interplay between state and federal law
by downplaying federal involvement. Although the Task Force's ap-
proach is not without its problems, if legislative resistance makes an
"ideal" system impossible, this Note advocates adoption of the Task
Force's approach wholesale. However, the Study Group and the Task
Force may be mistaken in their appraisal of the political obstacles to
the creation of a more desirable regime. To account for this possibil-
ity, the remainder of this Note will grapple with these obstacles.
The software industry has a strong interest in seeing that enforce-
ment of the Copyright Act does not hamper its ability to obtain the
greatest possible leverage from its copyrights. 164 If satisfying this in-
terest were the only concern, the best approach would be to exclude
the federal system from any role in the perfection of security interests
in intellectual property. State U.C.C. regulation more adequately ac-
commodates modem financing practices and provides stability and
predictability to business relationships. In contrast, the Copyright Act
barely speaks to security interests and contains outdated priority con-
cepts. 165 Furthermore, since the U.C.C. applies to all other forms of
personal property, exclusive application of Article 9 would promote
certainty if applied to copyrights as well. 166 Software companies in
particular would benefit from a strictly U.C.C. system because unfin-
ished or unpublished programs, protected solely under state trade se-
cret law, would receive continuous protection as they become subject
to the Copyright Act.167 Moreover, a strictly U.C.C. system would
resolve the problems faced by software vendors concerning the use of
copyright-related receivables as collateral. 68
However, there are other issues that must be considered in deter-
mining the best approach. As both the Study Group and the Task
Force acknowledge, Congress may resist calls to limit federal partici-
pation in the field. 169 Presumably, this resistance will be based on
something more than a desire to perpetuate existing bureaucracies.
Federal copyright policy, the interests of third party buyers who rely
upon the federal index for title information, and the power of the fed-
162. See supra notes 9-10.
163. See supra Part I(C).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 17-27.
165. See supra Part I(C).
166. Mesrobian & Schaefer, supra note 37, at 832.
167. See supra note 13 (discussing trade secrets and their relation to the Copyright
Act).
168. See supra notes 89-107 and accompanying text.
169. See P.E.B. REPORT, supra note 29, at 52-53; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28,
at 7.
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eral government's traditional role as repository for title transfer
records170 each must be weighed against industry interests.
(1) Copyright Policy
Congress must be mindful of the policies behind the Copyright
Act 171 as first set forth in the Constitution.172 These policies would be
furthered best by dismantling the federal recordation system. Neither
the protection of the public domain, the protection of the author, nor
the promotion of learning requires that federal law control the perfec-
tion of security interests. Both the public domain and the author will
be safeguarded, whether state or federal law applies, because these
policies concern the more substantive issues of the nature of copy-
rightable material on one hand and the rights of exclusivity on the
other.173 Further, the federal system works against the "keystone"
goal of promoting learning 74 because it places logistical hurdles in
front of parties wishing to perfect security interests in copyrights and
thus reduces incentives to create and publish new works.17 5 Federal
copyright policy is not an obstacle to a completely state law system.
(2) The Interests of Third Parties
Third parties have an interest in retaining some federal involve-
ment in any new recordation system. The Copyright Act provides for
recordation of transfers of title, 76 and buyers in ordinary course can
search the federal index to determine ownership. 177 If the index also
contained information regarding security interests in the related copy-
rights, as Peregrine suggests,178 a third party could search all claims in
one location. A lender's interest and a buyer's interest are not identi-
cal, and the federal system as it currently stands may reduce certain
small-transaction buyer costs at the lender's expense. The Study
170. Congress has long provided for copyright registrations and exchanges to be re-
flected in a federal copyright record. See Weinberg and Woodward, supra note 15, at 439
(discussing the history of the federal role in this area and asserting that copyright law pro-
vided a filing statute as far back as 1870). See also 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 7.
171. See Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 83.
172. See supra note 10.
173. See Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 83, at 50-52.
174. Id. at 49-50.
175. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
176. 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
177. The "collateral assignment" concept employed by the Copyright Act complicates
this analysis because a taking of a security interest so conceived is in effect a transfer of
title. See supra note 51. Thus, any meaningful reform which seeks to preserve the role of
the Copyright Act as a repository for title transfer information other than security interests
must account for the collateral assignment concept.
178. See supra Part I(B).
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Group's proposal attempts to protect the interests of buyers and
others relying on the federal index by retaining the federal system.179
The Task Force's approach discounts this interest as insignificant rela-
tive to the harm done by perpetuating the federal index system and
thus refers to the Study Group's proposal as "a step backward.' 180
Whatever the case, to the extent that members of the software indus-
try rely on the federal index when buying copyrights, the industry may
have some residual interest in maintaining at least some aspects of the
federal system.
(3) The Role of Tradition
Closely tied to the interests of third parties is the power of tradi-
tion supporting the current regime.' 8 ' Reliance on the part of law-
yers, grown out of the historical attachment of the intellectual
property bar to federal index systems,182 may be a substantial argu-
ment in favor of perpetuating these systems. Familiarity with a recor-
dation scheme promotes predictability and stability. However, given
that the alternative is the far less cumbersome and complex U.C.C.
system,183 such a tradition hardly seems worth preserving, particularly
in light of the rapidly changing nature of some of the property it
governs. 184
Therefore, none of the foregoing interests and policies should
prevent Congress from relinquishing its control over the recordation
of security interests in copyrights.
(4) Toward Complete State Law Preemption
If the Copyright Act were changed to provide for complete state
law preemption, the best approach would be twofold. First, section
301 should be altered in the manner set forth in the first version of
H.R. 897185 to provide that the Copyright Act does not apply to the
perfection of security interests. Second, section 205 should be
amended to revamp the concept of title to conform with a more mod-
em bundle-of-rights conception. 8 6 Under the new section 205, recor-
dation of transfers would apply to a transfer of copyright ownership' 87
179. See supra Part IH(A).
180. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 14.
181. See supra note 170.
182. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 14.
183. See supra note 78.
184. Mesrobian & Schaefer, supra note 37, at 828.
185. See H.R. 897.
186. See supra note 51.
187. Ownership here is used to denote the holding of a copyright itself. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(a) (1988).
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or to any of the exclusive rights obtained thereby,18s but not to a se-
curity interest. Thus, the U.C.C. would contain the only recordation
scheme and would provide the priority rule. These changes would sig-
nificantly overhaul the Copyright Act and would effectively cede
perfection of security interests in copyrights to state law. Article 9
would not need major changes, although amendments to the commen-
tary would probably be desirable.18 9
The magnitude of the changes required for such a revamping led
both the Study Group and the Task Force to eschew proposing such
sweeping reforms.190 Although political pragmatism has its merits,
these reformers have not taken strong enough steps to remedy the
problems in the field. At least one group of legislators was willing to
overturn Peregrine.91 This encouraging sign should be taken as the
signal to provoke a full-scale overhaul of the Copyright Act.
Conclusion
The current rules governing the perfection of security interests in
copyrights are simply too cumbersome and confusing to encourage the
use of copyrights as collateral. Burdensome filing requirements, legal
uncertainty, and logistical complexity have prevented software com-
panies from maximizing the value of their copyrights-often their
most important assets. This is the unfortunate result of the application
of the outmoded federal regime in areas in which it serves no signifi-
cant policy interest.
Three recent reform proposals have attempted to address this
problem, but only one of them effectively deals with the many
problems in the field. Even this approach does not sufficiently en-
courage growth and innovation by software companies. This Note
proposes that the Copyright Act be substantially amended so that
state law govern the perfection of security interests in copyrights.
188. See supra note 9.
189. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part II(A) (Study Group) and Part 11(B) (Task Force).
191. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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